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Salvaging the North Carolina
Teacher-Cyberbullying Statute
ABSTRACT
In 2012, the North Carolina General Assembly criminalized student
Internet activity intended to “torment” school employees. This Comment
contends that the legislation violates the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. It violates the First Amendment because it creates both
subject matter and viewpoint limitations on speech. It violates the
Fourteenth Amendment because the requirement that the student must
intend to “torment” a school employee creates an impermissibly vague
standard.
This Comment suggests that the North Carolina General Assembly could
correct the constitutional deficiencies in the legislation through revisions
that limit punishment to “true threats.” Such revisions would reign in the
broad coverage of the statute, while still protecting school employees and
school systems from the most serious and disruptive online student
misconduct.
INTRODUCTION
Students have long engaged in irreverent put-downs of their teachers.1
In the past, students whispered these things to each other in the cafeteria, at
recess, or at home. Today, students post these comments online.
Consider the predicament faced by Chip Douglas, a former high
school English teacher in the Mecklenburg County School System.2 One of
his students created a fake social-media account on Twitter3 under
Douglas’s name.4 The Twitter profile, made available to the public online,
portrayed Douglas as a hypersexual, violent drug addict.5 While students
1. See Adam Cohen, Why Students Have a Right to Mock Teachers Online, TIME (June
20, 2011), http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2078636,00.html.
2. See Lisa Miller, Cyberbullying Law Shields Teachers from Student Tormentors,
NPR (Feb. 19, 2013, 3:04 AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/02/19/172329526/cyber-bullinglaw-shields-teachers-from-student-tormentors.
3. TWITTER, https://twitter.com (last visited Apr. 30, 2015).
4. See Miller, supra note 2.
5. Id.
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may have viewed the fake Twitter profile as a mere prank, Douglas took it
seriously—especially when students in his classroom laughed at him.6
Douglas eventually resigned.7
The North Carolina General Assembly passed legislation titled “An
Act to Enact the School Violence Prevention Act of 2012” to prohibit the
type of student Internet activity that tormented Chip Douglas.8 The law
criminalizes various forms of student Internet activity conducted “[w]ith
the intent to intimidate or torment a school employee.”9 The new law
stands as one-of-a-kind. While student-on-student cyberbullying statutes
have become commonplace across the country, no other state legislature
has passed a criminal law solely aimed at protecting school employees
from the Internet activity of their students.10
This Comment argues that the North Carolina teacher-cyberbullying
statute cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny under the Due Process
Clause and the First Amendment. Because the open-ended intent-totorment requirement fails to put the public on notice of what conduct is
prohibited, the statute violates void-for-vagueness principles encompassed
in the Due Process Clause, allowing for arbitrary enforcement.11 The
statute also violates the First Amendment as a content-based restriction on
speech: it restricts speech based on both subject matter and viewpoint,
proscribing only speech that is intimidating or tormenting to school
employees, and only speech made by students.12
This Comment also suggests a solution: the statute should be revised
to punish only true threats,13 which do not receive constitutional

6. See id.
7. Id.
8. Act of July 12, 2012, ch. 149, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 715.
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.2(b)(1) (2013); see also id. §§ 14-458.2(b)(4), (5).
10. See Kevin P. Brady, Commentary, Criminal State Anti-Cyberbullying Statutes:
Does Legislative Zeal Outweigh Constitutional Considerations?, in 298 WEST’S EDUCATION
LAW REPORTER 21, 26–35 (2014) (categorizing various legislative responses to cyberbullying
and noting that North Carolina currently stands as the only state to pass a criminal statute
aimed at protecting school employees from cyberbullying).
11. See Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (stating that statutes
must not be “so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application” (first citing Int’l Harvester Co. of Am. v. Kentucky,
234 U.S. 216, 221 (1914); then citing Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634, 638 (1914))).
12. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (“[A]s a general matter, ‘the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.’” (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983))).
13. “True threats” are “those statements where the speaker means to communicate a
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular
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protection.14 This approach would also resolve due-process vagueness
concerns, since courts have recognized and defined true threats.15 Thus,
under a true-threat standard, students, parents, and law enforcement would
be put on notice as to what the law prohibits.
This Comment shows that the North Carolina teacher-cyberbullying
statute cannot pass constitutional muster as the law is currently written, but
argues that prohibiting only students’ true threats against school employees
can salvage it. First, this Comment provides an overview of the North
Carolina teacher-cyberbullying statute.16 Next, it recognizes two
constitutional objections to the statute: the due process void-for-vagueness
objection and the First Amendment free-speech objection.17 Finally, this
Comment demonstrates how limiting the application of the statute to true
threats can salvage the constitutional viability of the statute, while still
protecting school employees and school systems from the most harmful
and disruptive student Internet activity.18
I.

OVERVIEW OF THE TEACHER-CYBERBULLYING STATUTE

Generally speaking, North Carolina’s teacher-cyberbullying law
prohibits various forms of student Internet activity that is intended to
“intimidate or torment a school employee.”19 Students who violate the
individual or group of individuals.” Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (first citing
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam); then citing R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)).
14. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388 (noting that “threats of violence are outside the First
Amendment”).
15. See id.
16. See infra notes 19–52 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 53–163 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 164–203 and accompanying text.
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.2(b)(1) (2013); see also id. §§ 14-458.2(b)(4), (5). The
operative language reads as follows:
(b) Except as otherwise made unlawful by this Article, it shall be unlawful for any
student to use a computer or computer network to do any of the following:
(1) With the intent to intimidate or torment a school employee, do any of the
following:
(a) Build a fake profile or Web site.
(b) Post or encourage others to post on the Internet private, personal, or
sexual information pertaining to a school employee.
(c) Post a real or doctored image of the school employee on the
Internet.
(d) Access, alter, or erase any computer network, computer data,
computer program, or computer software, including breaking into a
password-protected account or stealing or otherwise accessing
passwords.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2015

3

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 5

394

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:391

statute are guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor,20 which can carry a sentence of
up to sixty days in jail and a one-thousand-dollar fine.21 In addition to
criminal punishment, the statute requires that the offending student be
transferred to a different school.22 If no “appropriate school” is available,
the student must be transferred to a different class or assigned a different
teacher—one who was not a target of the student’s cyberbullying.23
A. Legislative Purpose to Protect Children
The teacher-cyberbullying law was part of 2012 short-session
legislation aimed at preventing school violence.24 According to the
legislation, “the sole purpose of [the] law is to protect all children from
bullying and harassment, and no other legislative purpose is intended nor
should any other intent be construed from passage of [the] law.”25 In other
words, to achieve the purpose of protecting children, the General Assembly
elected to impose criminal sanctions on children who bully adults.
In support of the legislation, the North Carolina General Assembly
found that “a safe and civil environment in school is necessary in order for
students to learn and achieve high academic standards.”26 Further, bullying
(e) Use a computer system for repeated, continuing, or sustained
electronic communications, including electronic mail or other
transmissions, to a school employee.
(2) Make any statement, whether true or false, intending to immediately
provoke, and that is likely to provoke, any third party to stalk or harass a
school employee.
(3) Copy and disseminate, or cause to be made, an unauthorized copy of any
data pertaining to a school employee for the purpose of intimidating or
tormenting that school employee (in any form, including, but not limited
to, any printed or electronic form of computer data, computer programs, or
computer software residing in, communicated by, or produced by a
computer or computer network).
(4) Sign up a school employee for a pornographic Internet site with the intent
to intimidate or torment the employee.
(5) Without authorization of the school employee, sign up a school employee
for electronic mailing lists or to receive junk electronic messages and
instant messages, with the intent to intimidate or torment the school
employee.
Id. §§ 14-458.2(b)(1)–(5).
20. Id. § 14-458.2(c).
21. Id. § 15A-1340.23 (listing sentencing guidelines for various offense classifications).
22. Id. § 115C-366.4.
23. Id. However, the statute also permits a superintendent to “modify, in writing, the
required transfer of an individual student on a case-by-case basis.” Id.
24. Act of July 12, 2012, ch. 149, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 715, 715.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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and harassment “disrupt both a student’s ability to learn and a school’s
ability to educate its students in a safe environment” by creating “a climate
that fosters violence in our schools.”27 The General Assembly believed that
it was necessary to pass this law to protect students and to provide them
with the best possible learning environment.28
B. The Scope of the North Carolina Teacher-Cyberbullying Statute
Under the teacher-cyberbullying statute, criminal sanctions follow
when (1) any student using a computer or computer network29 (2) engages
in a form of the Internet activities contemplated in the statute30 (3) with an
“intent to intimidate or torment a school employee.”31
The statute defines the operative terms “student”32 and “school
employee,”33 and enumerates the proscribed Internet activities.34
Specifically, the Internet activities that the statute prohibits include
building a fake profile or website;35 posting or encouraging others to post
private information pertaining to a school employee;36 posting an image of
a school employee;37 accessing, altering or erasing digital data;38 repeated
electronic communications to a school employee;39 inciting the stalking or

27. Id.
28. Id. (“[I]t is essential to enact a law that seeks to protect the health and welfare of
North Carolina students and improve the learning environment for North Carolina
students.”).
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.2(b) (2013).
30. Id. §§ 14-458.2(b)(1)–(5) (listing various prohibited Internet activities).
31. Id. § 14-458.2(b)(1). Subsection (b)(2), which prohibits students from making “any
statement, whether true or false, intending to immediately provoke, and that is likely to
provoke, any third party to stalk or harass a school employee,” does not require a student to
have an intent to intimidate or torment a school employee. Id. § 14-458.2(b)(2). All other
Internet activities require a specific intent to intimidate or torment. Id. § 14-458.2(b).
32. The term “student” includes persons assigned to a traditional public school, enrolled
in a charter school or non-public school recognized by the state, as well as a person
suspended or expelled from any of these within the last year. Id. § 14-458.2(a)(2).
33. The term “school employee” includes any employee at a traditional public school,
charter school, or non-public school recognized by the state, as well as independent
contractors who carry out “duties customarily performed by employees of the school.” Id.
§ 14-458.2(a)(1).
34. Id. § 14-458.2(a).
35. Id. § 14-458.2(b)(1)(a).
36. Id. § 14-458.2(b)(1)(b).
37. Id. § 14-458.2(b)(1)(c).
38. Id. § 14-458.2(b)(1)(d).
39. Id. § 14-458.2(b)(1)(e).
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harassment of a school employee;40 copying and disseminating
unauthorized data pertaining to a school employee;41 signing a school
employee up for a pornographic Internet site;42 and signing a school
employee up for junk e-mail and instant messages.43
Thus, the statute makes relatively clear what persons qualify as
students, what persons qualify as school employees, and what Internet
activity the statute encompasses. Not all operative requirements under the
statute, however, are so well delineated.
C. The Meaning of “Intent to Intimidate or Torment a School Employee”
The cyberbullying law fashions a specific-intent requirement—the
“intent to intimidate or torment a school employee”44—that is defined
neither by the statute nor by common law. In North Carolina, specificintent crimes require “as an essential element a specific intent that a result
be reached.”45 In this context, the student must desire that the school
employee will be “intimidate[d] or torment[ed]” as a result of the online
Internet activity.46 However, the General Assembly left the task of
deciphering the meaning behind the statute’s “intent to intimidate or
torment” requirement to the public.47
The statute’s use of the word intimidate, standing alone, does not
create interpretive ambiguities. In North Carolina, “[i]ntimidate means to
make timid or fearful, inspire or affect with fear, and to compel action or
inactions as by threats.”48 Further, the Supreme Court of the United States
has defined intimidate to mean “where a speaker directs a threat to a person
or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily
harm or death.”49 Intimidate has been incorporated as an element in several
crimes, ranging from threatening a witness50 to common-law robbery.51 As

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. § 14-458.2(b)(2).
Id. § 14-458.2(b)(3).
Id. § 14-458.2(b)(4).
Id. § 14-458.2(b)(5).
Id. § 14-458.2(b).
State v. Jones, 451 S.E.2d 826, 844 (N.C. 1994).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.2.
See id. § 14-458.2(b).
St. John v. Brantley, 720 S.E.2d 754, 759 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (unabr. 2002)).
49. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003).
50. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-226 (prohibiting the threatening of witnesses through
intimidation).
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such, an “intent to intimidate” requirement stands readily adaptable to the
new criminal statute.
Conversely, the “torment” requirement lacks a statutory definition, a
settled legal meaning, or a common colloquial understanding.52 As written,
it is unclear what the intent-to-torment requirement prohibits or how
broadly it sweeps.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL DEFICIENCIES

Two particularly thorny constitutional problems arise from the North
Carolina teacher-cyberbullying statute’s narrow subject matter and
specific-intent requirement.53 First, the statute’s undefined specific-intent
element, which requires an “intent to intimidate or torment a school
employee,” invokes due-process concerns because it is unclear what
actions constitute tormenting a school employee.54 Second, the statute
creates an impermissible content-based restriction on speech because
criminal sanctions depend on whether the speech relates to the subject
matter of intimidating or tormenting a school employee from the viewpoint
of students.55
A. Fourteenth Amendment Due-Process Vagueness Concerns
The statute’s “intent to torment a school employee” requirement
violates due-process principles. The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause requires that state criminal laws possess some minimum degree of
definiteness.56 A statute must not be “so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.”57 When a statute is both vague and restrictive of speech,
51. See State v. Rivens, 261 S.E.2d 867, 869 (N.C. 1980) (explaining that robbery
requires “violence or intimidation” (citing State v. Smith, 150 S.E.2d 194, 200 (N.C.
1966))).
52. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 306 (2008) (stating that vague statutes
commonly lack “statutory definitions, narrowing context, or settled legal meanings” (first
citing Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971); then citing Reno v. ACLU,
521 U.S. 844, 870–71, 871 n.35 (1997))).
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.2(b)(1).
54. See id.
55. See Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove all else, the
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” (citations omitted)).
56. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S.
385, 391 (1926) (citing Int’l Harvester Co. of Am. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221 (1914)).
57. Connally, 269 U.S. at 391 (first citing Int’l Harvester Co., 234 U.S. at 221; then
citing Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634, 638 (1914)); see also Papachristou v. City of
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courts should be especially wary of the “obvious chilling effect on free
speech.”58 The purpose behind the definiteness requirement is twofold:
vague criminal statutes fail to place the public on notice of the prohibited
conduct and they allow for arbitrary arrests and prosecutions.59
The teacher-cyberbullying law violates this due-process definiteness
requirement for the following reasons: (1) the meaning of the word torment
lacks a common understanding, as demonstrated by a host of varying
dictionary definitions; (2) the torment requirement is reminiscent of other
vague statutes that have been struck down by the Supreme Court of the
United States; (3) the extent of allowable speech under the statute depends
on arbitrary circumstances, such as student location and a law enforcement
officer’s personal predilections; and (4) North Carolina case law fails to
clarify or limit the broad language of the statute.
1.

Multitude of Dictionary Definitions

The due-process problem with the North Carolina teachercyberbullying statute is not that it may occasionally be difficult for factfinders to determine whether a student intends to torment their teacher.
Rather, the problem is that it is difficult for students to determine what
torment actually means.60 Because torment lacks a common understanding
or plain meaning, as reflected by a multitude of varying dictionary
definitions, a person of ordinary intelligence lacks fair notice of the type of
conduct that the teacher-cyberbullying statute prohibits.
For example, in State v. Watson,61 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals looked to The American Heritage College Dictionary to define
torment for the purpose of interpreting the felony-stalking statute.62 From
that source, the court understood torment to mean “[t]o annoy, pester, or
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (“Living under a rule of law entails various
suppositions, one of which is that ‘[all persons] are entitled to be informed as to what the
State commands or forbids.’” (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939))).
58. Reno, 521 U.S. at 872; see also id. at 871–72 (explaining that “[t]he vagueness of
such a [content-based] regulation,” coupled with its increased deterrent effect as a criminal
statute, “raise[] special First Amendment concerns because of its obvious chilling effect on
free speech”).
59. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012) (describing the
two “discrete due process concerns” behind the void-for-vagueness doctrine).
60. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 306 (2008) (“What renders a statute
vague is not the possibility that it will sometimes be difficult to determine whether the
incriminating fact it establishes has been proved; but rather the indeterminacy of precisely
what that fact is.”).
61. State v. Watson, 610 S.E.2d 472 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
62. Id. at 477 (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1428 (3d ed.
1997)).
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harass.”63 This definition, however, is not the only understanding of the
term. Depending on which dictionary is consulted, the types of activity
that may implicate the word torment range from the severe to the
mundane—from subjecting others to medieval torture devices,64 to
throwing others into a commotion,65 to causing mere annoyance or
anxiety.66 The fact that no two dictionary definitions are consistent
illustrates the lack of a common understanding of the word.
Because torment lacks a uniform meaning, students, parents, teachers,
and the general public have little notice as to what the teachercyberbullying statute actually prohibits. A student who intends to merely
pester or annoy a teacher might not realize that, to some, her conduct could
be interpreted as an intent to torment.67 The standard created under the
statute is not merely imprecise; with drastically different connotations
behind the word torment, the North Carolina teacher-cyberbullying statute
creates no workable standard for students and for the public to know what
the law prohibits. The statute “violates the first essential of due process of
law”: the public must “guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.”68
2.

Modern Equivalent to Coates v. City of Cincinnati

The word torment as used in the statute is reminiscent of other laws
that the Supreme Court of the United States has previously struck down as
void for vagueness.69 The classic example of a hopelessly vague standard
is found in Coates v. City of Cincinnati.70 In Coates, a city ordinance
prohibited three or more people from assembling on a sidewalk and
“conduct[ing] themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by.”71
63. Id.
64. Torment, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
torment (last visited May 3, 2015).
65. Torment, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/torment (last
visited May 3, 2015).
66. Torment, YOURDICTIONARY, http://www.yourdictionary.com/torment (last visited
May 3, 2015).
67. See Watson, 610 S.E.2d at 477 (“‘Torment’ is defined as ‘[t]o annoy, pester, or
harass.’” (alteration in original) (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY,
supra note 62, at 1428)).
68. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
69. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (striking down a statute as
vague for use of the words “indecent” and “patently offensive”); Coates v. City of
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (striking down a statute as vague for use of the word
“annoying”).
70. Coates, 402 U.S. 611.
71. Id.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2015

9

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 5

400

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:391

Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart observed that “[c]onduct that
annoys some people does not annoy others.”72 Ultimately, the Court found
it constitutionally impermissible for criminal sanctions to depend on
something as arbitrary as whether or not someone is annoyed.73
The teacher-cyberbullying law stands as a contemporary equivalent to
the city ordinance struck down in Coates. Both the city ordinance in
Coates and the teacher-cyberbullying statute in North Carolina impose
criminal punishment on First Amendment rights based on a similar
“unascertainable standard.”74 The meaning of torment as judicially defined
by the North Carolina Court of Appeals includes the vague word annoy.75
As detailed above, numerous other definitions of torment also rely on the
word annoy.76 Because the statute’s torment requirement creates an
unascertainable standard, like the word annoying, the reasoning in Coates
should control. If criminal sanctions cannot depend on a standard as
arbitrary as whether someone is annoyed, they similarly cannot depend on
a standard as arbitrary as whether a student intends to torment (or pester,
annoy) a school employee.
3.

Permissible Speech and Arbitrary Circumstances

One of the primary reasons that the Due Process Clause forbids vague
criminal laws is because they allow for arbitrary enforcement.77 The Due
Process Clause requires “a legislature [to] establish minimal guidelines to
govern law enforcement.”78
Vague criminal statutes “permit ‘a
standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to
pursue their personal predilections.’”79

72. Id. at 614.
73. See id. (“[T]he ordinance is vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to
conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in
the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.”).
74. See id. (striking down an ordinance as “unconstitutionally vague” where “it subjects
the exercise of the right of assembly to an unascertainable standard”).
75. See State v. Watson, 610 S.E.2d 472, 477 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005); see also supra
notes 61–63 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text.
77. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012)
(“[P]recision and guidance are necessary so that those enforcing the law do not act in an
arbitrary or discriminatory way.” (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–
09 (1972))).
78. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S.
566, 574 (1974)).
79. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Smith, 415 U.S. at 575).
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At best, inconsistent arrests can be expected to follow as a direct result
of the uncertainty within the specific-intent requirement of the teachercyberbullying statute.80 A school-resource officer in Robeson County may
understand torment to mean “annoy excessively,”81 while a school-resource
officer in Halifax County may apply the much more stringent definition of
“extreme pain or anguish of body or mind.”82 As such, the officer in
Robeson County would arrest a student for online comments that the
officer in Halifax County would not believe amounted to more than a mere
annoyance. With statutory uncertainty, the extent of permissible online
student speech may vary based on one’s county of residence or even the
school-resource officer assigned to a particular school.
At worst, a law-enforcement officer could use the uncertainty within
the statute to justify penalizing a student that the officer dislikes. An
imprecise criminal statute “furnishes a convenient tool for ‘harsh and
discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against groups
deemed to merit their displeasure.’”83 A law-enforcement officer who, for
whatever reason, holds a grudge against a certain student, would be able to
take advantage of the vague statutory standard, taking a more relaxed view
of the intent-to-torment requirement than he otherwise would. Essentially,
the uncertainty behind the intent-to-torment requirement invites arbitrary
enforcement in violation of the Due Process Clause.
4.

Lack of Guidance in the Case Law

North Carolina case law fails to offer much guidance for interpreting
the word torment. In State v. Watson,84 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals upheld the state’s felony-stalking statute85 in the face of dueprocess objections.86 At that time, the felony-stalking statute criminalized
the willful following or harassing of another person, with the intent to place
a person in reasonable fear, or the intent to cause a person emotional
distress.87 The parties in Watson disputed the meaning of the words

80. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.2(b)(1) (2013) (stating the specific-intent
requirement for the teacher-cyberbullying law); see also supra notes 44–47 and
accompanying text.
81. Torment, DICTIONARY.COM, supra note 65.
82. Torment, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 64.
83. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 360 (quoting Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S.
156, 170 (1972)).
84. State v. Watson, 610 S.E.2d 472 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3(a)(1) (repealed 2008).
86. Watson, 610 S.E.2d at 477–78.
87. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3(a)(1).
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harasses and harassment,88 and whether those terms complied with
definiteness requirements under the Due Process Clause.89 The felonystalking statute defined harassment as communication “directed at a
specific person that torments, terrorizes, or terrifies that person and that
serves no legitimate purpose.”90
Rejecting the defendant’s argument that the statute failed to meet
definiteness requirements, the North Carolina Court of Appeals defined the
harassment statute’s use of the word torments to mean “annoy, pester, or
harass.”91 This would be fine if the felony-stalking statute itself did not
define harassment with reference to the word torment.92 A circular
definition of torment that relies on the unconstitutionally vague word
annoy93 is not particularly helpful in defining the specific-intent
requirement within the cyberbullying context, because it fails to put the
public on notice of the prohibited conduct.
The felony-stalking statute, as construed in Watson, however, is
distinguishable from the teacher-cyberbullying statute. Although the
felony-stalking statute used the word “torment,” that word was not an
essential element of the crime. Rather, the word was merely a part of the
definition for the word harassment.94 The felony-stalking statute required
placing a person in reasonable fear of harm or causing substantial
emotional harm—a more readily definable standard.95
The troubling result of the teacher-cyberbullying law’s imprecision is
that a student familiar with the statute may avoid any sort of online
criticism of school employees whatsoever. Free speech is “delicate and
vulnerable,” and “[t]he threat of sanctions may deter [its] exercise almost
as potently as the actual application of sanctions.”96 Aside from multiple
inconsistent dictionary meanings, many of which define torment with
88. The felony-stalking statute defined harassment as communication “directed at a
specific person that torments, terrorizes, or terrifies that person and that serves no legitimate
purpose.” Watson, 610 S.E.2d at 476 (emphasis added) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-277.3(3)).
89. Id. at 476–77.
90. Id. at 476 (emphasis added) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3(3)).
91. Id. at 477 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 476.
93. See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (striking down the
statute as vague for use of the word “annoying”).
94. Watson, 610 S.E.2d at 476.
95. Id.
96. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844, 872 (1997) (“The severity of criminal sanctions may well cause speakers to remain
silent rather than communicate even arguably unlawful words, ideas, and images.” (citing
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 494 (1965))).
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reference to the already unconstitutionally vague word annoy,97 the public
has little guidance for deciphering the word torment. As such, “men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.”98 The Due
Process Clause requires more.
B. First Amendment Freedom-of-Speech Concerns
In addition to violating due-process definiteness requirements, the
North Carolina teacher-cyberbullying statute violates the First Amendment
guarantee of free speech.99 Freedom of speech “is the matrix, the
indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.”100 The
teacher-cyberbullying statute violates this principal right by silencing
speech of a particular viewpoint and subject matter.
1.

Content-Based Restriction

The North Carolina teacher-cyberbullying statute creates a selective,
content-based limitation on speech, because criminal sanctions depend on
whether the speech relates to the subject of intimidating or tormenting a
school employee. The law also discriminates on the basis of viewpoint,
punishing only speech that is made by students, and only those students
whose perspective toward school employees is negative.
A law that burdens speech because of its content is “presumptively
invalid” as an impermissible abridgment of freedom of speech.101 The First
Amendment principle of content neutrality “prohibits the government from
choosing the subjects that are appropriate for public discussion.”102 “[T]he
content neutrality principle is invoked when the government has imposed
restrictions on speech related to an entire subject area.”103 When a law

97. Compare Coates, 402 U.S. at 614 (striking down statute as vague for use of the
word annoying), with Watson, 610 S.E.2d at 477 (defining torment as used in the felonystalking statute to mean “annoy, pester, or harass”).
98. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (first citing Int’l Harvester
Co. of Am. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221 (1914); then citing Collins v. Kentucky, 234
U.S. 634, 638 (1914)).
99. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
100. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937), overruled on other grounds by
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
101. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“Content-based regulations
are presumptively invalid.”).
102. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 59 (1983).
103. Id.
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prohibits “particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of
the First Amendment is all the more blatant.”104
The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly held that “a
speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.”105
North Carolina courts have been especially cautious in deciding cases
involving abridgements of the freedom of speech.106 Such abridgments are
particularly dangerous because they “pose the inherent risk that the
Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to
suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public debate
through coercion rather than persuasion.”107
The First Amendment permits restrictions based on the content of
speech in only “a few limited areas.”108 This narrow range of well-defined
areas includes instances of incitement, obscenity, defamation, fighting
words, child pornography, frauds, true threats, and speech presenting a
grave and imminent threat to the government.109 No legislator possesses
“freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside the
scope of the First Amendment.”110
The North Carolina teacher-cyberbullying law constitutes an
impermissible subject-matter restriction on speech because it imposes a
restriction on student speech that is outside the permissibly restricted
categories. The law proscribes an entire subject area: “intimidat[ing] or
torment[ing] a school employee.”111 Speech concerning school employees

104. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (citing
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391).
105. See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806,
2820 (2011) (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515
U.S. 557, 573 (1995)); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S.
47, 64 (2006) (quoting Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573).
106. See Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711, 717 (N.C. 1988) (refusing to recognize “the
constitutionally suspect private facts invasion of privacy tort”). See generally C. Calhoun
Walters, Comment, A Remedy for Online Exposure: Recognizing the Public-Disclosure Tort
in North Carolina, 37 CAMPBELL L. REV. 419, 429–37 (2015) (discussing North Carolina’s
traditionally conservative approach to First Amendment jurisprudence).
107. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
108. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (quoting R.A.V., 505 U.S. at
382–83).
109. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (listing categories of
unprotected speech).
110. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472; see also R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383 (‘“[T]he freedom of
speech’ referred to by the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these
traditional limitations.”).
111. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.2 (2013).
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does not fall outside First Amendment protection.112 Nevertheless, the
North Carolina General Assembly deemed speech that relates to the subject
of intimidating or tormenting school employees inappropriate for student
online discussion.113
It remains permissible under the statute to direct intimidating and
tormenting online remarks to another person, so long as that person is not a
school employee. For example, the statute does not impose criminal
sanctions on a student who builds a fake social-media profile or website for
a librarian employed at the county public library. But criminal sanctions
can follow if a student creates an identical profile or website for a librarian
employed at the high school library.114 On its face, the statute constitutes a
selective, content-based limitation on speech, since criminal sanctions are
keyed to the subject matter of the speech––the intimidating or tormenting
of a school employee.
The statute also creates viewpoint discrimination that disfavors the
views of specific speakers—students who voice negative feelings toward a
school employee. The Supreme Court of the United States describes
viewpoint discrimination as “an egregious form of content discrimination”
where the law targets “particular views taken by speakers on a subject”115
or “restrict[s] the expression of specific speakers.”116 As such, “[v]iewpoint
discrimination is censorship in its purest form.”117
Under the teacher-cyberbullying law, non-student members of the
public are free to say what they wish about school employees—online or
otherwise—regardless of whether they have the intent to torment a school
employee. A non-student who desires to intimidate or torment a school
employee by posting a picture of that school employee online is not
prohibited from doing so under the teacher-cyberbullying law. But
criminal sanctions can follow when a student posts that same picture of the
school employee with the intent to intimidate or torment.118 Because the
law criminalizes speech by students that would be legal if delivered by a
non-student, the statute discriminates based on viewpoint.
112. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544 (listing categories of unprotected speech); see also
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 59 (1983) (stating that the
First Amendment “prohibits the government from choosing the subjects that are appropriate
for public discussion”).
113. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.2.
114. Id. § 14-458.2(b)(1)(a).
115. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (citing
R.A.V., 505 U.S. 391).
116. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 812 (2000).
117. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
118. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.2(b)(1)(c).
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While the public, including students, generally enjoys the right to
speak freely on the Internet, students are now at risk of criminal sanctions
if they speak ill of school employees online with a specified intent.119
Because the law on its face burdens speech on the basis of subject matter
and viewpoint, courts must hold the statute to exacting scrutiny.120
2.

Strict Scrutiny and the Teacher-Cyberbullying Statute

“[S]trict scrutiny leaves few survivors.”121 As a content-based, subject
matter, and viewpoint restriction on free speech, the North Carolina
teacher-cyberbullying law would not survive constitutional review. Strict
scrutiny imposes a high burden on state speech regulations, and “[i]t is rare
that a regulation restricting speech because of its content will ever be
permissible.”122 Strict scrutiny requires a statute that regulates speech
based on its content to be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling
governmental interest.123 If a less restrictive alternative would serve the
government’s purpose, the legislature must employ that alternative.124
As stated above, the enacting legislation states that the “sole purpose”
of the teacher-cyberbullying law is to protect children from bullying and
Punishing
harassment, expressly disclaiming any other purpose.125
students, who are almost always children, for cyberbullying school
employees, who are almost always adults, is not narrowly tailored to fit the
General Assembly’s sole expressed purpose of “protect[ing] all
children.”126 Under the teacher-cyberbullying statute, no child receives
protection from bullying and harassment; in fact, children are only
punished under the law. Tenuous logic and a bit of imagination would be
required to fathom situations where the law serves the purpose of
protecting children. To find a compelling governmental interest served by
the statute, courts would have to ignore the statement in the legislation that

119. See id. § 14-458.2.
120. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543 (2012) (“When content-based
speech regulation is in question . . . exacting scrutiny is required.”).
121. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 455 (2002) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
122. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S 803, 818 (2000).
123. Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (stating that the
government may “regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to
promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the
articulated interest”).
124. See id.
125. Act of July 12, 2012, ch. 149, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 715, 715; see also supra text
accompanying note 25.
126. Act of July 12, 2012, ch. 149, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws at 715.
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provides “no other legislative purpose . . . be construed from passage of
this law.”127
Within the legislative findings, the General Assembly identified
several other potential governmental interests that might be advanced by
the teacher-cyberbullying statute.128 Specifically, the findings noted the
importance of fostering the optimal learning environment for children,
while also serving their general welfare.129 The General Assembly found
that “a safe and civil environment in school is necessary in order for
students to learn.”130 The bill also noted that permitting bullying in any
form promotes the potential for school violence.131 Thus, if one discounts
the General Assembly’s “sole purpose” proviso,132 it is clear that the law
seeks to protect the health and welfare of students and school employees
for the purpose of improving the learning environment.
A compelling interest has been described as an interest “of the highest
order,”133 an “overriding state interest,”134 and an “unusually important
interest.”135 The Supreme Court has recognized education as “perhaps the
most important function of state and local governments.”136 As such, this
Comment assumes that protecting the health and welfare of school
employees for the purpose of improving the learning environment
constitutes a compelling state interest. It does not follow, however, that
imposing criminal sanctions on students who intend to intimidate or
torment a school employee on the Internet is sufficiently tailored to
protecting that interest.137

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. (“[I]t is essential to enact a law that seeks to protect the health and welfare of
North Carolina students and improve the learning environment for North Carolina
students.”).
130. Id.
131. Id. (stating that “bullying and harassing behaviors create a climate that fosters
violence in our schools” and “national data and anecdotal evidence have established the
need to identify the most vulnerable targets and potential victims of bullying and
harassment”).
132. See id.; supra text accompanying note 25.
133. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
134. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (citing First Nat’l
Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978)).
135. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 530 (1986) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
136. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
137. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) (“[T]he mere fact that a statutory
regulation of speech was enacted for the important purpose of protecting children . . . does
not foreclose inquiry into its validity.” (citing Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492
U.S. 115, 129 (1989))).
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While fostering an optimal educational environment is undeniably a
worthy legislative goal, the teacher-cyberbullying statute fails to achieve
that goal because it does not actually deter teacher cyberbullying. Despite
the “national data and anecdotal evidence” cited in the legislation,138
research suggests that criminal sanctions are not an effective means to
combat cyberbullying, because such measures have no deterrent effect on
students.139 While the law punishes student cyberbullies with potential jail
time, the threat of harsh punishment will not cross most students’ minds
when they post content on the Internet about school employees.140
It is generally agreed that adolescent brains have not “yet fully
developed to the point where we can assume rationality in the face of
unknown or unlikely consequences.”141 The Supreme Court of the United
States also recognized this principle when, in the context of a juvenile
death-penalty case, it suggested that “[t]he likelihood that the teenage
offender has made the kind of . . . cost-benefit analysis . . . is so remote as
to be virtually nonexistent.”142
Students are especially unlikely to consider the consequences of their
online actions. Adolescent students, as social media users, often do not
even realize the potential breadth of their online audience.143 Many people,
including students, post online under the false belief that only “friends”
will ever look at their content.144 Exacerbating this problem, many
commonly used social-media websites, such as Twitter, design their

138. Act of July 12, 2012, ch. 149, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 715, 715.
139. See, e.g., John O. Hayward, Anti-Cyber Bullying Statutes: Threat to Student Free
Speech, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 85, 90 (2011) (“Rather than attempting to legislate cyber
bullying out of existence (a quixotic dream), a more productive approach would be one that
is proactive and educational, while seeking to guide young people in the responsible use of
new technology.”); Ari Ezra Waldman, Tormented: Antigay Bullying in Schools, 84 TEMP.
L. REV. 385, 385 (2012) (arguing that criminal penalties “are unlikely to solve the problem
of bullying and cyberbullying in schools and unlikely to succeed as effective punishments”).
140. See Waldman, supra note 139, at 434.
141. Justin W. Patchin, Deterring Teen Bullying: Dos and Don’ts, CYBERBULLYING RES.
CTR. (Feb. 21, 2014), http://cyberbullying.us/deterring-bullying/.
142. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837 (1988).
143. See Lauren Gelman, Privacy, Free Speech, and “Blurry-Edged” Social Networks,
50 B.C. L. REV. 1315, 1315 (2009) (stating that technology “permit[s] users to create social
networks with ‘blurry edges’—places where they post information generally intended for a
small network of friends and family, but which is left available to the whole world to
access”).
144. See id. at 1329 (“[T]he design of [social media] sites creates an aura of privacy by
suggesting they are for limited disclosure of information to a defined social network of
‘friends.’”).
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privacy controls in such a way that users of the site do not deploy them.145
Moreover, the Internet’s “disinhibiting effect” is well documented. Users,
including students, do not hesitate to post messages online that they would
never say in person.146
Unaware of their audience and emboldened in a virtual world,
students who are subject to criminal punishment for cyberbullying remain
unlikely to stop and weigh the consequences before posting online about a
school employee.
Thus, criminal sanctions fail to deter teacher
cyberbullying. In fact, the law achieves no purpose beyond the punishment
and retribution of student offenders.147
Criminal punishment of students who cyberbully school employees is
not narrowly tailored if it can be replaced with a less restrictive alternative,
such as school administrative punishment.148 North Carolina law already
requires local educators to address the problem of cyberbullying on a
school administrative level.149 Specifically, schools must “develop and
implement methods and strategies for promoting school environments that
are free of bullying or harassing behavior.”150 Public school systems across
the state have developed ways to address the problem of cyberbullying
through school discipline.
The Wake County School Board’s disciplinary policies, for example,
apply to any student “whose conduct at any time, place, or cyberspace, on
or off campus, has or is reasonably expected to have a direct and immediate
impact on the orderly and efficient operation of the schools or the safety of
individuals in the school environment.”151
This succinct policy
encompasses online posts and avoids burdening a student with a criminal
145. Id. at 1328–29 (first citing Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Setting Software
Defaults: Perspectives from Law, Computer Science and Behavioral Economics, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 583, 589–97 (2006); then citing Ralph Gross & Alessandro Acquisti,
Information Revelation and Privacy in Online Social Networks, 2005 ACM WORKSHOP ON
PRIVACY ELECTRONIC SOC’Y 71, 74–78).
146. John Suler, The Online Disinhibition Effect, 7 CYBERPSYCHOL. & BEHAV. 321, 321
(2004) (“Everyday users on the Internet––as well as clinicians and researchers––have noted
how people say and do things in cyberspace that they wouldn’t ordinarily say and do in the
face-to-face world.”).
147. See Waldman, supra note 139, at 434 (“[A]ntibullying criminal laws seem to lack
all indicia of good criminal laws other than their provision of retributive value.”).
148. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S 803, 815 (2000) (“[I]f a
less restrictive means is available for the Government to achieve its goals, the Government
must use it.”).
149. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-407.17 (2013).
150. Id.
151. 6410 Code of Student Conduct, WAKE COUNTY PUB. SCH. SYS., http://webarchive.
wcpss.net/policy-files/series/policies/6410-bp.html (last visited May 2, 2015).
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record. Similarly, public schools in Durham County punish bullying in
“written, electronic, or verbal” forms,152 implying that online bullying can
be punished. School boards in less populous counties have adopted similar
policies. Columbus County schools, for example, prohibit bullying “at any
time or place when the behavior has a direct and immediate effect on
maintaining order and discipline in the schools.”153 These examples are not
exhaustive, but illustrative, as many other systems across the state have
adopted similar policies.
School-board policies cover much of the same conduct contemplated
by the statute. For example, a school in Columbus County could
administratively punish a student for creating a fake social-media profile or
website directed at a school employee.154 Consider how a Columbus
County school could respond to the students who created the fake Twitter
profile portraying Chip Douglas.155 Columbus County schools prohibit
online bullying “when the behavior has a direct and immediate effect on
maintaining order and discipline in the schools.”156 Because the fake
Twitter profile disturbed class time with students laughing at their teacher,
it caused a “direct and immediate effect on maintaining order and discipline
in the schools.”157 Thus, a student who creates a parody profile could be
administratively punished in Columbus County without criminal
repercussions.
It is important to note, however, that school discipline is not entirely
free from First Amendment concerns. The Third Circuit has held that a
student cannot be punished for online speech that occurs away from
school.158 The Fourth Circuit where North Carolina sits, however, allows
schools to punish online student speech where it “could reasonably be
expected to reach the school or impact the school environment.”159 The
Fourth Circuit standard, however, does not address the viability of criminal
152. 4411: Bullying/Harassment, DURHAM PUB. SCHOOLS, http://www.dpsnc.net/pages/
Durham_Public_Schools/District/About_DPS/District_Policies/Series_4000_-_Student_Ser
vices/4411 (last visited May 2, 2015).
153. Student Rules and Regulations: Grades K–8, COLUMBUS CTY. SCH. 23 (July 16,
2012), http://www.columbus.k12.nc.us/k8rulesregs.pdf.
154. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.2(b)(1).
155. See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text.
156. Student Rules and Regulations, supra note 153, at 23.
157. Id.
158. See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir.
2011) (holding that a school could not punish student speech “reaching beyond the
schoolyard to impose what might otherwise be appropriate discipline”).
159. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011). The court
allowed a student to be administratively punished for creating a social-media page that was
“dedicated to ridiculing a fellow student.” Id. at 567.
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punishment, since it involved only school administrative punishment.160
Thus, according to Fourth Circuit precedent, North Carolina school boards
have a license to implement less drastic, noncriminal administrative
methods to punish teacher cyberbullying.
Instead of allowing school boards and school officials to continue
implementing policies that address teacher cyberbullying, the teachercyberbullying statute shifts responsibility to law enforcement. The
legislation states that its “sole purpose” is to protect children,161 but, as this
Comment has explained, the law does not in fact protect any child. Even if
the legislative aim is to protect school employees in order to “improve the
learning environment for North Carolina students,”162 the law is not tailored
to achieving that end. Criminal sanctions fail to deter instances of schoolemployee cyberbullying and, instead, function only as retribution. School
administrative punishment already serves this function and does not result
in criminal charges against students. Given the overwhelming burden for
statutes that restrict speech based on its content under the First
Amendment, the North Carolina teacher-cyberbullying statute does not
pass constitutional muster.
III. THE NORTH CAROLINA TEACHER-CYBERBULLYING
STATUTE SALVAGED
While the North Carolina teacher-cyberbullying statute raises both due
process and First Amendment concerns, the North Carolina General
Assembly can revise the statute to rectify these concerns. This Part
suggests that the General Assembly take two steps. First, the legislative
record should be revised to reflect an accurate and realistic legislative
purpose. Second, the statute should only prohibit “true threats.” Revising
the statute in this manner would reign in the overly broad coverage of the
statute, while still allowing punishment for the most disruptive and
culpable student Internet activity.
A. Prerequisite to Improvement
As a prerequisite to any redrafting of the statute, the North Carolina
General Assembly should revise the legislative record to better reflect the

160. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (“Our
problem lies in the area where students in the exercise of First Amendment rights collide
with the rules of the school authorities.”).
161. See Act of July 12, 2012, ch. 149, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 715, 715; see also supra
text accompanying note 25.
162. Act of July 12, 2012, ch. 149, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws at 715.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2015

21

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 5

412

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:391

statute’s intended purpose. As written, the legislation states that its “sole
purpose . . . is to protect all children from bullying and harassment,” and
that “no other legislative purpose is intended nor should any other intent be
construed from passage of [the] law.”163 Since the teacher-cyberbullying
statute in fact protects not children, but only adult school employees, from
bullying and harassment, it fails to achieve its express legislative
purpose.164 Exacerbating the problem, the General Assembly tied the
hands of judges to construe the statute by forbidding consideration of any
other legislative intent.165
The law seeks to protect school employees, not children, from online
bullying and harassment. By protecting school employees from certain
online student activity, presumably, the General Assembly aims to
“improve the learning environment for North Carolina students.”166 Before
making any improvement to the substance of the North Carolina teachercyberbullying statute, the legislative record should be revised to reflect this
broader, more realistic, legislative end.
B. The “True Threat” Requirement
To cure the due process and First Amendment objections, the statute
should be revised in a manner that only punishes students who
communicate “true threats” to school employees. To accomplish this end,
the word torment should be stricken from the statute. The remaining
“intent to intimidate” requirement should be legislatively defined to mean
“a threat to a [school employee] with the intent of placing the [school
employee] in fear of bodily harm or death.” Such a revision would avoid
the Fourteenth Amendment vagueness problem, as well as the First
Amendment content-based restriction problem, while still protecting school
employees and school systems from the most disruptive student Internet
activity.
In the 2003 case of Virginia v. Black,167 the Supreme Court of the
United States defined what speech constitutes “true threats.”168 Black
involved two defendants accused of violating the same Virginia law, which

163. Id.
164. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.2(b) (2013).
165. See Elec. Supply Co. of Durham v. Swain Elec. Co., 403 S.E.2d 291, 294 (N.C.
1991) (“In matters of statutory construction, our primary task is to ensure that the purpose of
the legislature, the legislative intent, is accomplished.” (citing State ex rel. Hunt v. N.C.
Reinsurance Facility, 275 S.E.2d 399, 405 (N.C. 1981))).
166. Act of July 12, 2012, ch. 149, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws at 715.
167. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
168. Id. at 359–60.
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prohibited cross burning with the intent to intimidate others.169 The first
defendant burned a cross on the front yard of an African American.170 The
second defendant burned a cross on private property during a Ku Klux
Klan rally.171 According to the Court, the First Amendment did not protect
the first defendant, but shielded the second defendant.172 A majority of the
Court found that the first defendant’s speech was not protected because
burning a cross in another’s front yard was “likely to inspire fear of bodily
harm.”173 As to the second defendant, however, the Court ruled that the act
of burning a cross on private property, without more, did not constitute a
true threat, since the same fear of personal injury did not exist.174
The Court clearly defined “true threats” as “those statements where
the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of
individuals.”175 The speaker need not intend to carry out the threat, but
only to place another in fear of bodily harm.176
Proscribing only true threats would avoid due-process vagueness
concerns by “provid[ing] a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of
what is prohibited.”177 Unlike the word torment, with its multiple
inconsistent definitions,178 the Supreme Court has defined intimidate in the
context of true threats.179 By removing torment from the statute and
defining intimidate to mean “true threats,” neither the public nor law
enforcement would have to guess what types of student Internet activity is
prohibited. Namely, the crime would only occur when a student possesses
“the intent of placing [a school employee] in fear of bodily harm or
death.”180 The intimidation-as-true-threat standard has been approved by
the Supreme Court of the United States and has developed through

169. Id. at 348.
170. Id. at 350.
171. Id. at 348–49.
172. Id. at 362–63.
173. Id. at 363.
174. Id. at 359.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 360 (“Intimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a
type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the
intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.”).
177. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (first citing Hill v. Colorado,
530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000); then citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09
(1972)).
178. See supra notes 60–68 and accompanying text.
179. Black, 538 U.S. at 360.
180. Id.
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subsequent judicial decisions. As such, the amendment would assuage
Fourteenth Amendment due-process concerns.
Overcoming First Amendment content-based objections presents a
more complex hurdle. Even if the teacher-cyberbullying law prohibits only
a category of unprotected speech, such as true threats, it continues to hinge
on the content of the speech.
The prohibition on content-based restrictions is so entrenched within
the First Amendment’s protection that even a law restricting speech within
the narrow range of permissible areas, such as true threats, may still violate
the First Amendment. In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,181 a local ordinance
prohibited fighting words, but only those based on race, color, creed,
religion, or gender.182 Although fighting words are considered to fall
outside of the First Amendment’s protection, the Court in R.A.V. held that
the ordinance failed as a content-based restriction on speech.183 The
primary problem with the restriction was that the law only applied to
fighting words that “insult[ed] or provoke[d] violence[] ‘on the basis of
race, color, creed, religion or gender.’”184 Other forms of fighting words,
such as those based on political affiliation, union membership, or sexual
orientation, were not covered by the ordinance.185 The Court ruled that the
First Amendment did not permit the city “to impose special prohibitions on
those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects.”186
The Court, however, did indicate that content-based restrictions within
a category of unprotected speech would be permissible “[w]hen the basis
for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire
class of speech at issue is proscribable.”187 Under this exception, “a
content-based distinction is permissible if it directly advances the reason
why the category of speech is unprotected.”188
The R.A.V. Court identified three principal reasons why the First
Amendment does not protect true threats: (1) to protect “individuals from

181. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
182. Id. at 380.
183. Id. at 381.
184. Id. at 391 (quoting the ordinance at issue in R.A.V.).
185. Id.
186. Id. (first citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991); then citing Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S.
221, 229–30 (1987)).
187. Id. at 388.
188. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 11.3.3, at
1038 (4th ed. 2011).
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fear of violence”; (2) to prevent “the disruption that fear engenders”; and
(3) to prevent “the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.”189
The Court has illustrated the operation of this exception in the context
of true threats in two cases.
First, in Virginia v. Black,190 discussed above in this Comment,191 the
Court found burning a cross with the intent to intimidate proscribable
because it is “a particularly virulent form of intimidation” that is “most
likely to inspire fear of bodily harm.”192 In other words, a state can prohibit
cross-burning in order to protect individuals from “fear of violence.”193
Second, in R.A.V., the Court explained that the federal government
may not prohibit threats against the President that only reference the
President’s “policy on aid to inner cities”; but the federal government may
generally prohibit threats against the President because of the
overwhelming interest “in allowing him to perform his duties without
interference from threats of physical violence.”194 Thus, true threats are
also proscribable in order to prevent “the disruption that fear engenders.”195
The North Carolina General Assembly should be able to
constitutionally prohibit students’ online true threats against school
employees because of the overwhelming state interest in education and
allowing school employees to perform their educational duties without
disruptive threats of violence coming from students on the Internet. In the
unique context of schools and education, student Internet activity that aims
to intimidate school employees constitutes a “particularly virulent form of
intimidation” with great potential to create substantial disruption in schools
and communities.196 Fear of violence takes away the ability of school
employees “to focus on educating and supporting students.”197 Instead of
spending more time on improving the educational environment, the school
must expend “resources to assure student and building security and address
discipline issues.”198
Moreover, threats of violence against school

189. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388.
190. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
191. See supra notes 167–76 and accompanying text.
192. Black, 538 U.S. at 363.
193. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388.
194. Id. (quoting Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam)).
195. Id. (citing Watts, 394 U.S. at 707).
196. Black, 538 U.S. at 363.
197. PREVENTION INST., FACT SHEET: VIOLENCE AND LEARNING 1 (May 2011), http://
www.preventioninstitute.org/component/jlibrary/article/id-301/127.html.
198. Id.
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employees “affect the ability to recruit and maintain a quality of teaching
and administrative staff in the system.”199
A student’s threat of violence against a school employee, even if it is
made online, detracts from the educational environment because of the
disruption that it engenders. Punishing student threats against school
employees is constitutionally permissible in order to prevent that type of
disruption.200
Such a restriction fits squarely within the R.A.V.
framework.201
Revising the legislative record and defining the statute’s intent-tointimidate requirement to mean “true threats” would salvage the North
Carolina teacher-cyberbullying statute while still protecting school
employees and school systems from the most disruptive and culpable forms
of online student speech––online student activities that are designed to
intimidate school employees.
CONCLUSION
The North Carolina General Assembly has taken a proactive approach
to preventing the emerging problems of teacher cyberbullying.
Unfortunately, the current North Carolina teacher-cyberbullying statute
creates a vague standard that risks chilling student speech. Restriction on
student speech in this area is particularly problematic, given that students
are the most likely to alert the public of teacher misconduct, with the
Internet serving as their most likely forum.202 This modern problem must
be met and curbed with realistic, effective, constitutional solutions.
If lawmakers altered the statute to prohibit only “true threats,” as
defined by the Supreme Court of the United States in Black, the public
would be able to ascertain what the statute forbids, and students would be
able to adjust their conduct accordingly.203 This would quell vagueness
concerns under the Due Process Clause.

199. Id.
200. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388 (stating that true threats are unprotected to prevent “the
disruption that fear engenders”).
201. See id.
202. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (observing that through the Internet,
any person can become “a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from
any soapbox”).
203. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003) (“Intimidation in the constitutionally
proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a
person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or
death.”).
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Freedom-of-speech concerns would also dissipate, as the First
Amendment would not protect true threats of violence against school
employees.204 This revision would reign in the broad coverage of the
statute and still protect school employees and school systems from the most
serious and disruptive online student misconduct. Until changes are made,
however, student speech in North Carolina will remain suppressed due to
the absence of clear guidelines regarding what types of Internet activity
will cross the line.
James L. Seay III*

204. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388 (“[T]hreats of violence are outside the First
Amendment.”).
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